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ARGUMENT
L

RESPONSE TO GONZALEZ'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Gonzalez did not dispute any of the facts detailed in RSC's Brief of Appellant.

However, Gonzalez's Brief of Appellee contains a version of "facts" which are disputed by
RSC, but have no bearing on whether the trial court erred when: (1) it ruled that RSC, due
solely to its status as a general contractor, was liable as a possessor of land under
Restatement (Second) of Torts §384; and (2) it erroneously ruled that the Gonzalez's
Amended Complaint sufficiently alleged a premises liability claim against RSC. The
aforementioned errors are questions of law for this Court to determine. See, Salt Lake City
v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1995) ("A trial court's decision to
grant or deny a motion for summary judgment is a legal one and will be reviewed for
correctness. Therefore, all issues in this case will be reviewed de novo, giving no deference
to the trial court's conclusions.")(internal citations omitted). Additionally the trial court's
interpretation "of prior precedent, statutes, and the common law are questions of law that we
review for correctness." See, In re Estate of Ostler, 2009 UT 82 ^f 7.
Notwithstanding Gonzalez's attempt to create issues of fact by presenting a one-sided
version of the same, this Court is not being asked to weigh issues of disputed fact. Rather,
this interlocutory appeal requests this Court to determine whether the trial court erred as a
matter of law when: (1) it ruled that RSC, due solely to its status as a general contractor, was
liable as a possessor of land under Restatement (Second) of Torts §384; and (2) it
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erroneously ruled that Gonzalez's Amended Complaint sufficiently alleged a premises
liability claim against RSC. Accordingly, RSC requests that, to the extent that Gonzalez's
statement of facts do not address the legal issues noted above, this Court not consider the
same.
IL

THE PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGED "DIRECT NEGLIGENCE" CLAIMS
ARE ILLUSORY AND INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE CLAIMS
PROPERLY DISMISSED BY UTAH COURTS.
Gonzalez urges this Court to ignore the long established general rule in Utah that "the

employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by
an act or omission of the contractor or his servants." Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, ^f 13,
979 P.2d 322. While Gonzalez attempts to creatively circumvent this well established legal
rule by characterizing his claims against RSC as "direct negligence" claims, Gonzalez's
attempts to do so are illusory and are nothing more than an exercise in creative semantics.
Gonzalez readily admits that his allegations of "direct negligence" as contained in his
amended complaint are based in premises liability. See, Brief of Appellee at 13. While
Gonzalez's attempt to re-cast his allegations as "premises liability" claims will be addressed
in further detail in III and IV, infra, as will be demonstrated below, none of Gonzalez's
allegations are properly characterized as "direct negligence" that would fall outside Utah's
retained control doctrine.
As pointed out by the Utah Supreme Court in Magana v. Dave Roth Construction,
2009 UT 45 122, 215 P3d. 143, the retained control doctrine "...recognizes that one who

2
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hires an independent contractor and does not participate in or control the manner in which
the contractor's work is performed owes no duty of care concerning the safety or the manner
or method of performance implemented." (citing Thompson, 1999 UT 22, f 13)(emphasis
added)). The commonly accepted reason for the aforementioned rule is that, where the
principal employer does not control the means of accomplishing the contracted work, the
sub-contractor "is the proper party to be charged with the responsibility for preventing the
risk [arising out of the work], and administering it and distributing it." Id. (quoting Prosser
& W. Keaton, The Law of Torts 509 (5th ed. 1984)(emphasis added).
It is undisputed that Gonzalez was injured while installing soffit and fascia on the
north side of building four. (Record 838). It is further undisputed that JCC was responsible
for supervising its employees, was responsible for the safety equipment JCC employees
utilized, and had complete control over the method and manner in which it performed its
work on the Project. (Record 839 - 840). Finally, it is undisputed that on the day of his
injury, the only workers present at building four were Gonzalez and his two co-workers.
(Record 836). RSC was not present at the jobsite on the date of the injury, and was unaware
of JCCs presence on the Project. (Record 836).
While Gonzalez argues that RSC is liable for his injuries because of the manner of the
building's construction or overall site safety, similar arguments have consistently been
rejected by Utah Appellate Courts and are not considered "direct negligence" claims. For
example, mSmith v. Hales Warner Constr., Inc., 2005 UT App. 38, this Court addressed the
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issue of whether the "injury causing aspect of the work" relates in a broad overall sense, /. e.,
all similar activities on a construction project, or in a narrow sense, i.e. only over the activity
which caused the injury:
Plaintiffs argue that in this case "control over the manner" of the "injurycausing aspect of the work" relates broadly to all carpentry activities,
including framing, of the church. On the other hand, Defendants urge a
more narrow view of the "injury-causing aspect of the work," as
including only the manner of framing the wall that fell on Decedent. The
trial court interpreted "injury-causing aspect" narrowly, finding that
neither H & W nor CPB "exerted control over the means utilized by" the
framers "at the time of the [ajccident" We agree with the trial court that
under Thompson, retained control requires active participation in the
method or operative detail of the injury-causing activity in order to
impose liability.
Id at \ 10 (emphasis added).
Both RSC and Gonzalez have cited to Magana in support of their positions.
Consequently, a thorough review of the Magana case is necessary to properly address the
issues before this Court. From the outset, it is important to recognize that the Utah Supreme
Court in Magana upheld both this Court and the trial court's determination that all of
Magana's claims, except for one, were barred by retained control doctrine. The sole
surviving claim in Magana concerned Magana's allegation that the general contractor's
supervisor directly participated in the negligent rigging of a load of trusses, i.e. negligently
rigged the load of trusses himself
Gonzalez's theory of "direct negligence" is dependant upon his novel premises
liability claim. In articulating his "premises liability" claim Gonzalez specifically directs this
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Court to subsections (a), (^) and (h; of Paragraph 28. See, Brief of Appellee at 29

30.

Gonzalez argues that his "direct negligence" claims are similar to the sole surviving claim
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1

As noted above, in Magana, the only issue that remained for the trial court was
whether "[defendant's supervisor] indeed assisted in the rigging of the load of trusses that
slipped and fell on Magana is a question of fact regarding [defendant's supervisor's] direct
negligence." Magana, 2009 UT 45, ^f 39 (emphasis added). None of the remaining claims
in Magana, including, inter alia, the failure to properly maintain a safe construction site, the
failure to disclose and warn of known dangers, the failure to correct a known hazardous
condition or the failure to implement and follow safe work policies and procedures were held
by the Utah Supreme Court to constitute "direct negligence."
Unlike the instant case, the direct negligence claim in Magana originated from the
general contractor's supervisor's alleged direct participation inriggingthe load of trusses that
fell on Magana. While the Gonzalez claims that RSC "failed to take reasonable steps to
make the premises safe for subcontractors," the Utah Supreme Court specifically stated that
the general contractor in Magana "did not owe Magana a duty to ensure that [Magana's
employer] conducted the off-loading process safely." Id. at f 35. The Magana Court's
conclusion further illustrates what constituted the defendant's "direct negligence." Because
of its clear application to this case it is quoted at length:
The court of appeals correctly held that DRC, through its agent
Campbell, did not retain control of the off-loading of the truss joists by
determining where to place the walls of the restaurant, deciding with
Circle T where to off-load the lumber on-site, hiring the crane company
that assisted in the off-loading, bearing responsibility for on-site safety,
and directly participating in rigging the second load of truss joists. In
each instance, Magana's claims either exceeded the scope of the injurycausing aspect of Circle T's work or failed to meet the active
6
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participation standard. But the active participation standard, does not
apply to Magana's direct negligence theory. By asserting that Campbell
himself negligently rigged the truss joists, Magana's negligence claim
exceeds the scope of the retained control doctrine because the assertion
relates to Campbell's acts, and not the acts of Circle T. Further, Magana's
testimony that he witnessed Campbell rig the second load is sufficient to
create a factual issue as to direct negligence. Therefore, we reverse the
court of appeals1 decision and remand this case to the dwtrj.-t , nun for
liirther proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Id. at % 40 (emphasis added).
L .i^'

jcjici ;i a}i:Lu.u;i m Ma^ufiu K.V ui»] not participate in J"CC's soffit and

fascia work (R\'0'v

•

-.

.•:**. IKJJJIK
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r

even present and working on building 4 at the Lime o, the accident. (Record 6?<
asserting that RSC was negligent because it did. not warn JCC or take precautions to ensure
•n:i' • « \ •

:, ,s . .K , was perfoi.iica :^uci>, Ooiizdlez n^tempts to

impermissibly shift JCC's responsi^i-'

,. ,

,

(.

,

responsibility for preventing the risk" to RSC. See, Prosser & W. Keaton, The Law of Torts
509 (V1" cd. 19K4). i lowever I Jtah law is clear that RSC, "owes no duty of care concerning
the safely oi tlk. nidiuici ui memod of performance
Mag ana, 2009 UT 45, % 23 (emphasis added).

o\ J L L / S soffit and, fascia, work.

'

U adopted by this Court,, Gonzalez's premises liability argument would directly
undermine the holding in Magana and other retained, control cases and would impose new"
and onerous duties i xpon general conti actoi s in I ) tali I "' :>i example, the following claims
properly dismissed in Magana, would under Gonzalez's now! flicwv consiitnlo "ilinvl
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negligence": (1) the failure to properly maintain a safe construction site, (2) the failure to
disclose and warn of known dangers, (3) the failure to correct a known hazardous condition,
and (4) the failure to implement and follow safe work policies and procedures. Similarly, the
claims against the general contractor in Begaye v. BigD Const Corp. 2008 UT 4,178 P.3d
343, would have constituted "direct negligence" under Gonzalez's premises liability
argument. See, Begaye v. BigD Const. Corp. 2008 UT 4 at <[| 5 fh. 2. ("Begaye also argues
that Big D had a contractual duty to provide a safe work environment and is therefore liableas a matter of law-for injuries sustained by a subcontractor.") However, both this Court and
the Utah Supreme Court have consistently held that, "...one who hires an independent
contractor and does not participate in or control the manner in which the contractor's work
is performed owes no duty of care concerning the safety or the manner or method of
performance implemented."

Id. at f 22 (citing Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, ^

13)(emphasis added). Because it is undisputed that RSC did not participate in Gonzalez's
work and indeed, was not even present on the day of the accident, RSC could not have been
"directly negligent" as outlined in Magana. Based upon the foregoing, RSC is entitled to a
reversal of the trial court's decision and RSC should be granted summary judgment as a
matter of law.
III.

PROXIMITY TO HIGH VOLTAGE OVERHEAD POWER LINES IS A
RISK INHERENT IN GONZALEZ'S WORK.
In advocating for the adoption of § 384, Gonzalez claims that all jurisdictions that

have considered § 384 have adopted it. However, Gonzalez reluctantly acknowledges that
8
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only three states of the 22 states cited by Gonzalez haw applied \^K4 in tin1 nidiim i
advocated here, See, Brief of Appellee at 23. The remaining 19 cases Gonzalez cited to the
tna : • sM\.. ii,, Oivuvi nii.dJh>. ..niidren'or other third party members of the public
employee of a si ibcontractoi

not an

W h ile Gonzalez still claims "[ I ]he o \ erwhelming weight of

authority across the country," is in his favor, the fact that ov\\ • h: v states ha\ r • . * *inthemamier suggested by Gonzalez and the potential ramifications on prior Utah precedent
siioaki give uii^ ^ ouri pause. . >\ us (tohnmwi,. Restatement §384 imposes certain duties for
' » A\\\ • *!-i '•

•
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.

- , s . ::-. : ', riiis language is inipoi'tanl I he Utah

Supreme Court has already examined similar Restatement iam:;:aiH and l"iiml lli.i!
"[S]ections 41.3, 416, and 427 each speak of liability fV "njur\ u: others/ which implies
third parties rather than employees of the independent contractor carrying out the contracted
WOfK " Human, i:

^i}' ' '

<

:>

•- i p - v shLi

• .- •..

.,.- .-, i. Mv' ; s n t

cited above, Gonzalez argues (for the first time inhis appeal) that the risk he en.

,v • • •

the jobsite was not a risk inherent in his work. See, Brief of Appellee at 24. llo\\e\e:, db
• • *•

,i-. nionsiiau.-j ouiow, viunzaiez's argument that tnc risk at issue was not inherent in

Gonzalez's woil dirtv.llv ronlradicls (jon/altv's ni<Miinrandiiui ni nppnsitmn i< ^unmiiirv

judgment and should be rejected by tins Court.
Gonzalez readily admits that "when risks 'inhere to the manner in which the work is
done' ' it is more i easonable and promotes saiety lo require the subcontractor to protect itself
from such risks." See. Brief* of Apprlln ,il '(Mi.|iiolmg I lioinpsoii IWL) III
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1. ]\ ill n

Further, Gonzalez acknowledges, "Why should a general contractor have to protect a
subcontractor from a risk that is part and parcel of the very job for which the subcontractor
was hired?" See, Brief of Appellee at 24. Finally, Gonzalez concedes that "Sorensen's
concern.. .might have merit if the alleged duty involved liability for a risk inherent in the
work, which risk should be allocated to the subcontractor/worker himself." Id. (emphasis
added). Notwithstanding these admissions, Gonzalez astonishingly claims that even though
Gonzalez's work primarily consisted of installing long lengths of conductive metal siding,
soffit and fascia on buildings while utilizing tall metal ladders, proximity to power lines and
the associated dangers therewith are not dangers that are inherent in his work. Id. at 20,24.
Gonzalez's argument is absurd on its face, contradicts the position taken in his opposition
to summary judgment and should be rejected by this Court.
The first case that addressed the inherent risk issue was Dayton v. Free, 148 P. 408
(Utah 1914). In Dayton, the Plaintiff was employed as a miner by Stewart Mining Company.
The Plaintiff was working on a mine owned by Snake Creek Mining and Tunnel and operated
by Free & Taylor. The Plaintiff was drilling into the face of the mine when he struck a
"missed hole", an explosive which had misfired, and was injured when the hole detonated.
He sued the owner of the mine (Snake Creek) and the operator of the mine (Free & Taylor):
The alleged negligence is that the defendants failed and neglected to
notify or warn him of the missed hole, by reason of which he was injured
while he and others, without knowledge of the missed hole, were drilling
holes at the face of the tunnel.
Id. at 409.
10
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In affirming judgment for the defendants, the Utah Supreme Court held that the hazard
of a "missed hole" was a danger incident to the work for which the defendants owed no duty
of protection:
And, as has been seen, it having neither reserved nor exercised direction
or control over the work, or the time or manner of doing it, it owed him
no duty to provide a safe place to work, or to warn or notify him of
missed holes, or to guard him against dangers incident to or created by
the prosecution of the work, and certainly not to guard or protect him
against the negligence of those who had employed him or with whom he
labored.
Id. at 412. (emphasis added). Eighty-five years later, based in large measure on Dayton v.
Free, the Utah Supreme Court decided Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, the seminal case in
Utah regarding the retained control doctrine.
In order to counter nearly one hundred years of Utah case law, Gonzalez argues for
the first time in his appeal that the risk of coming into contact with a high voltage power line
is not a risk inherent in his work. This argument is a sweeping departure from Gonzalez's
Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment wherein Gonzalez argued that RSC
should have anticipated the harm, notwithstanding the fact that the risk was inherent to
Gonzalez's work. In his memorandum in opposition Gonzalez acknowledged:
In this instance, it is clearlyforeseeable that while in the course of doing
the soffit and fascia and (sic) Jose may have been distracted or forgotten
a high voltage power line was nearby.
In describing the last-named scenario (the "deliberate encounter
exception"), Hale cited as an example the very situation present here: a
worker whose job requires him to encounter a dangerous condition.

11
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Similarly, a jury could reasonably conclude that Sorensen should have
anticipated that a subcontractor, who has to work in the immediate
vicinity of the power line, holding large objects or tools in his hands,
might inadvertently come into contact with the power line.
(Record 850)(emphasis added).
RSC submits that Gonzalez's new argument on appeal both departs from and
contradicts the argument contained in his memorandum in opposition to summary judgment
and should be disregarded by this Court. See, Pratt v. City Council, 639 P.2d 172,173-74
(Utah 1981)("Issues not raised [before the lower court] cannot be raised on appeal.")
To further his new argument, Gonzalez provides this Court with several "straw man"
examples, rather than address the obvious, i.e., that a subcontractor that installs long pieces
of conductive metal while standing on conductive ladders or scaffolding high above the
ground faces several risks inherent in the same, including the potential for contacting a high
voltage overhead power line. The first "straw man" attempts to limit Gonzalez's risks
inherent to the tools he uses, "Gonzalez's injury had nothing to do with the method or
manner in which soffit is installed - Gonzalez did not injure himself by using a nail gun
improperly, for example." See, Brief of Appellee at 17. This "straw man" ignores other
inherent risks associated with Gonzalez's work. For example, because Gonzalez was
working high above the ground, both proximity to power lines and falling are risks inherent
in his work. In this case, Gonzalez climbed upon another trade's scaffolding without
permission and failed to wear any fall protection or to protect against a high voltage power
line. (Record 884) Indeed, arguing that RSC created the risk due to the proximity of the
12
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building to the power line is akin to arguing that RSC created the risk of Gonzalez falling due
to the building's height. This "straw man" example should be disregarded.
The next "straw man" attempts to limit the dangers working near power lines to only
those workers that are working directly on the line itself, "If Gonzalez had been hired to
repair or sleeve the power, then proximity to the lines would be inherent to his work." Id.
at 20. Much like the first straw man, this argument unreasonably limits an inherent risk to
only those workers that worked on the power line itself. The case of Hillabrand v. Drypers
Corp., 2002 WL 31260045 (Ohio Ct. App., October 10,2002)(unpublished), a case cited by
both RSC and Gonzalez in support for their respective positions2 is instructive.
In Drypers, Drypers Corporation ("Drypers") hired Holt Roofing ("Holt") to perform
a roof repair on a commercial building Drypers occupied and leased from another entity. The
plaintiff was a supervisor of Holt and was injured when, while standing on the roof, he threw
metal debris into a dumpster positioned below. A piece of metal debris inadvertently made
contact with a power line causing an electrical flash which injured the plaintiff. The plaintiff
brought suit against Drypers, claiming that Drypers negligently positioned the dumpster
below energized power lines. Drypers moved for summaryjudgment based upon the retained
control doctrine, which was granted by the trial court. In affirming the trial court, the Ohio
2

Gonzalez argues that the Drypers case supports their argument that another court has
"recognized that retained control and premises liability as separate theories of liability
against a general contractor." See, Brief of Appellee at 22. However, Gonzalez fails to
mention that, much like the "general contractor/owner" in Hale v. Beckstead, the "general
contractor" in Drypers was also the lessee of the property in question thus making a
premises liability analysis more appropriate.
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Third District Court of Appeals held that proximity to overhead power lines was a danger
inherent in roof repair. M a t 5.
The final "straw man" is the most obvious. Gonzalez claims that "It was not inherent
in the job for Gonzalez to encounter an unreasonably close power line on the site any more
than it would have been inherent for him to encounter a pit of spikes." Id. at 24. While
Gonzalez does not indicate how often subcontractors on construction sites encounter a "pit
of spikes", it is reasonable to conclude that subcontractors that work high above the ground
encounter power lines on a regular basis. Indeed, a common phrase directed towards not
only construction professionals, but to the public at large, is "Look up before you go up."
Indeed, this final "straw man" argument completely ignores Gonzalez's previous argument
to the trial court that notwithstanding the fact that Gonzalez knew of and appreciated the risk,
RSC should have anticipated that Gonzalez "who has to work in the immediate vicinity of
the power line, holding large objects or tools in his hands, might inadvertently come in
contact with the power line." (Record 850).
As pointed out above, Utah law has long recognized that the employer of the injured
worker has the most knowledge of the work to be performed, the risks inherent in the same
and is in the best position to assess and control the safety precautions for its employees.
Gonzalez's argument would serve to diminish worksite safety rather than promote it as it
advocates taking the primary safety responsibility from the subcontractor most
knowledgeable with the work and its particular hazards and places it in the hands of the
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general contractor. Consequently, Gonzalez' premises liability argument, while beneficial
to Gonzalez, would ultimately make Utah construction projects less safe and should be
explicitly rejected by this Court.
IV.

GONZALEZ'S AMENDED COMPLAINT DID NOT ADEQUATELY
PLEAD A PREMISES LIABILITY CAUSE OF ACTION.
Gonzalez claims that his amended complaint "plainly stated" a premises liability claim

against RSC. However, a review of the allegations and claims in the Gonzalez's amended
complaint clearly demonstrates that the claims in Gonzalez's complaint are anything but
"plainly stated." Although Utah R. Civ. P. 8 does not demand that a complaint be a model
of clarity or exhaustively present the facts alleged, it does require, at a minimum, that a
complaint give each defendant fair notice of the plaintiffs claim[s] against it and the grounds
upon which the claim[s] rest. See, Utah R. Civ. P. 8; Heathman v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990
(1962). The amended complaint filed by Gonzalez utilizes a "shotgun" pleading format that
lumps all of the defendants together in each cause of action and provides no factual basis to
distinguish their conduct.

For example Gonzalez's first cause of action states that,

"Defendants breached their duty of care to Plaintiff by, among other things...." (Record 130)
Paragraph 28 of the amended complaint then enumerates nine allegations (a - i) one of which
(d) contains five subparts towards the "Defendants," not to solely to RSC. (Record 130 —
131) Gonzalez's amended complaint does not differentiate which allegation relates to which
defendant; instead, Gonzalez alleges the same conduct against all defendants irrespective the
actual applicability of the same.
15
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In a case like this, where multiple defendants are involved and many factually distinct
claims are raised, the amended complaint should at a minimum contain specific allegations
with respect to each defendant. Generalized allegations that lump multiple defendants
together without specifying which defendant is targeted by which allegation is insufficient
to permit the any one defendant, or the Court, to ascertain exactly what is being alleged and
against whom. See, Gauvin v. Trornbatore, 682 F.Supp. 1067, 1071 (N.D.Cal.1988)
(lumping together of multiple defendants in one broad allegation fails to satisfy notice
requirement of Rule 8(a)(2)); Van Dyke Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 399 F.Supp. 277,284
(E.D.Wis.1975) ("Specific identification of the parties to the activities alleged by the
plaintiffs is required in this action to enable the defendant to plead intelligently."); Atuahene
v. City of Hartford, 10 Fed. Appx. 33 (2d Cir.2001)("[b]y lumping all the defendants together
in each claim and providing no factual basis to distinguish their conduct, [plaintiffs]
complaint failed to satisfy this minimum standard....").
As a consequence of Gonzalez's failure to distinguish his allegations among the
several defendants, it is nearly impossible for RSC or this Court to accurately discern the
factual underpinning of each claim. Indeed, most of the claims in Paragraph 28, above, are
facially inapplicable to certain defendants and violate Utah R. Civ. P. 11. For example,
Gonzalez lacks a rational basis, much less a factual basis, to allege that Rocky Mountain
Power breached a standard of care related to the erection of scaffolding; however,
Gonzalez's complaint alleges just that. While Gonzalez claims that his complaint "plainly
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stated" a claim for premises liability against RSC, to accept this argument, this Court would
also have to conclude that Gonzalez's complaint "plainly stated" a premises liability claim
against Rocky Mountain Power and the stucco subcontractor, R.M. Rees Construction.
Furthermore, any claim for premises liability asserted against any defendant other than
Orchard Vista, the property's owner, is facially deficient as a matter of law because
Gonzalez's amended complaint fails to allege that any defendant other than Orchard Vista
owned or possessed the property. See, Hevelone v. City Market, Inc., 2005 UT App. 215
("Hevelone's failure to allege City Market's ownership or possession of the fire lane where
the hazard was located is fatal to her premises liability claim.")
Gonzalez's amended complaint can best be described as a "shotgun complaint." The
amended complaint indiscriminately disperses general allegations against all defendants and
then places the burden on each defendant and the Court to specifically identify which
allegations potentially pertain to which defendant. In defense of his amended complaint,
Gonzalez argues that that if any uncertainty existed, the burden was on RSC and the other
defendants to ferret out the deficiencies and inaccuracies in Gonzalez's deficient pleading
through motions or discovery. In essence, Gonzalez argues that RSC and the other parties
should have filed costly motions and/or conduct time consuming discovery rather than have
Gonzalez distinguish which allegations are directed to which defendant. Indeed, given the
fact that Gonzalez readily admits that his premises liability claim is premised upon a legal
theory that has not been adopted by a Utah Appellate Court, it is unclear exactly what
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discovery RSC should have conducted. Gonzalez's position would require defendants to not
only conduct discovery on legally recognized causes of action but to anticipate and conduct
discovery on potential causes of action as well regardless of whether or not the cause of
action is supported by existing law. Gonzalez's position undermines judicial economy and
encourages needless motions and/or discovery and should be rejected by this Court.
As mentioned above, this Court has previously held that a Plaintiffs failure to allege
a defendant's ownership and possession is fatal to a premises liability claim. See, Hevelone
v. City Market, Inc., 2005 UT App. 215. Gonzalez concedes that RSC was not an "owner"
or "possessor" of land. See, Brief of Appellee at 33. Instead, Gonzalez argues that in RSC
should have realized the possibility a premises liability claim could be predicated solely upon
RSC's capacity as a general contractor, because as a general contractor, RSC's legal duties
are "the same as" or "analogous to" that of an owner or possessor. Claiming that RSC should
have realized that a general contractor's legal duties are "the same as" or "analogous to" that
of an owner or possessor of land, implicitly assumes that Utah law recognizes such a legal
duty. However, Gonzalez readily admits that Utah has not adopted such a legal duty. See,
Brief of Appellee at 15. ("The only issue, therefore, is whether Utah would join the majority
ofjurisdictions in adopting §3 84. Sorenson correctly notes that the Utah Supreme Court has
not yet done so.") This Court should reject Gonzalez's fallacious and circular reasoning.
RSC could not have been on notice of a claim that even Gonzalez concedes has not been
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recognized in Utah3. Consequently, the trial court's determination that Gonzalez sufficiently
plead a premises liability claim against RSC5 notwithstanding the fact that such a claim is not
adopted in Utah, is in error and should be reversed by this Court.
CONCLUSION
Utah law is clear that RSC, as the general contractor on the Project, cannot be liable
for the workplace injury of Gonzalez unless RSC exercised affirmative control over the
injury causing aspect of Gonzalez' work. Gonzalez' attempt to recast his claims against RSC
as direct negligence and premises liability fail as a matter of law, as they conflict with
established Utah law. Utah has not adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts §384 and should
not adopt it as it is in direct contravention of Utah's general rule of non-liability. Gonzalez's
arguments on appeal concerning whether contact with a power line is a risk inherent in his
work are inconsistent with his arguments to the trial court and are merely "straw man"
arguments that should be disregarded by this Court. Because it is undisputed that RSC did
not directly participate in Gonzalez's performance in the injury causing aspect of the work,
the trial court erred in denying RSC's Motion for Summary Judgment.

3

The absurdity of Gonzalez's circular reasoning is further demonstrated in Issue 2 of
Gonzalez's "Issues Presented on Appeal." See, Brief of Appellee at 2. Gonzalez argues
that RSC failed to preserve the issue of whether Gonzalez adequately plead a premises
liability cause of action because it was not raised until RSC's reply memorandum. In
Utah, a reply memorandum is limited to "rebuttal of matters raised in the memorandum in
opposition." See, Utah R. Civ. P. 7 (c)(l)(emphasis added). RSC's first notice of
Gonzalez's premises liability claim came in Gonzalez's opposition to RSC's motion for
summary Judgment and RSC was therefore entitled to rebut it. In rebutting this argument
RSC properly preserved this issue for appeal.
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Further, Gonzalez9 s attempt to impose landowner premises liability duties upon RSC,
fail as Gonzalez failed to properly plead or give notice of his premises liability claim.
Gonzalez5 s argument in defense of his deficient pleadings would require a party to anticipate
causes of action that are not recognized by Utah Appellate Courts and are inconsistent with
established Utah law. Furthermore, because Gonzalez failed to plead that RSC owned or
possessed the property in question, his alleged premises liability claim fails as a matter of
law.
Based upon the foregoing, RSC respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district
court's decision and direct the district court to grant RSC's Motion for Summary Judgment
as a matter of law.
DATED this LA ^day of July, 2011.
BERRETJ TAYLOR & CURTIS, L.C.
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